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NOTES
Playing Telephone: The Federal Circuit Misinterprets
Precedent By Ignoring Context in Sky Technologies, LLC v.
SAP AG
I. Introduction
Suppose Moneybags, Inc. is a lender that makes a loan to a startup
technology company with few assets.  Moneybags wants to encourage small
businesses and the technology industry in particular, but most importantly it
wants to make a nice profit for its shareholders.  The only problem is that
lending to technology companies is risky; lots of companies have good ideas
but remarkably few successfully implement them and turn a profit.  Moneybags
wants some assurance that it will not be left high and dry if the technology
company fails and stops repaying the loan.  What can Moneybags do?  As a
lender, Moneybags usually requires borrowers to pledge some sort of collateral
to secure the loan, but this company does not have sufficient tangible assets to
cover its value.
The startup technology company responds with a different type of offer.  It
may not have a lot of tangible assets, but it is rich with assets that play an
important role in an industrialized economy — ideas.  The company holds a
number of patents, which it plans to use to get rich.  “We’ll use the patents as
collateral for the loan,” the company tells Moneybags, “and if we default on our
loan, you can take the patents just like you could any other asset.”  Moneybags
looks into the patents, makes some phone calls, and decides that the patents are
probably valuable enough to secure the loan.
Subsequently the startup technology company goes kaput, like many
technology startups are so apt to do.  After the loan goes into default,
Moneybags follows the usual foreclosure procedures and buys the patents at a
public auction.  Being accustomed to foreclosing personal property, Moneybags
follows all of the requirements in the state Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”).  Because it has no experience with intellectual property, however,
Moneybags does not know that patent transfers must usually be in writing to be
valid. Consequently, it never gets a written patent assignment from the broke
technology company.  Some time later, Moneybags sues another company for
patent infringement.  Suddenly, the infringing company argues in court that
Moneybags does not actually own the patents because it never received a
written assignment of the title in accordance with federal patent rules.  Is
Moneybags’ ownership of these patents valid without a written assignment?
57
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Faced with a similar situation, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held in Sky Technologies, L.L.C. v. SAP AG that the lender was
the rightful owner.1  In Sky Technologies, the court held that state law permits
the transfer of a patent by foreclosure without a written assignment.2  To reach
this conclusion, the court relied on its prior decision3 in Akazawa v. Link New
Technology International, Inc.,4 which permitted a patent transfer by operation
of law without a written assignment in the context of intestate succession.5  The
court extended Akazawa’s rationale by concluding that a foreclosure is a
transfer by operation of law, and held that a patent foreclosure is a valid transfer
of title even without a written assignment.6
This note contends that the Federal Circuit reached the wrong conclusion in
Sky Technologies by misapplying precedent; in particular, the court
overextended Akazawa’s holding by applying it to foreclosures.  Part II of this
note discusses the law as it stood before the Sky Technologies decision,
examining statutes and relevant cases.  Part III then discusses the Sky
Technologies decision, first discussing the facts and procedural history of the
case and then summarizing the court’s rationale.  Part IV examines the court’s
reasoning and discusses (1) how the court incorrectly applied Akazawa and
other precedent in holding that state law, rather than federal, determines the
ownership of patents, including transfers; (2) how the court overextended
Akazawa’s holding, that patents can be transferred by operation of law, by
applying Akazawa to a class of transferee not anticipated by the federal patent
act or by other precedent; and (3) the policy justifications and implications that
inform and result from the Sky Technologies decision.  This note concludes in
Part V. 
II.  Law Before The Case
An appreciation of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Sky Technologies
requires an understanding of the law before the decision.  Patents are statutory
creatures, existing because the government has chosen to give special
recognition to the otherwise intangible property rights in inventions.7  Though
1. See 576 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 1379.
3. See id.
4. 520 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
5. Id. at 1356.
6. Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1379.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).  Though the U.S. Constitution
grants Congress the power to regulate patents, the patent laws themselves are codified in
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patents are governed generally by statutes, it is up to courts to interpret these
statutes and clarify their often murky provisions.  Section A discusses the patent
statutes relevant to the Sky Technologies decision, and Section B discusses case
precedent. 
A. Statutes
Patents are generally governed by federal statute.  Title 35, section 261 of the
United States Code governs the assignment of patent rights.8  According to 35
U.S.C. § 261, rights in patents “shall be assignable in law by an instrument in
writing.”9  This section also requires assignments to be recorded with the Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO); if not recorded with the PTO within three
months, an assignment is void against a later claim.10  The language of the
statute clearly suggests that an assignment must be written and recorded to be
valid.11  Nevertheless, 35 U.S.C. § 261, by its terms, applies only to assignments
and does not on its face state that assignment is the only way for patent rights
to be transferred.12 
Section 154 of title 35 concerns the contents of a patent.13  According to this
section, every patent must contain “a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns.”14  Thus, the patent statutes anticipate three distinct categories of
owners: patentees, heirs of patentees, and assigns of patentees.15  Section B
discusses how United States’ courts have treated issues of patent ownership.
B. Cases
Though federal statutes govern patents generally, it is up to the courts to
provide guidance by putting flesh on the skeletal framework.  Though the
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate patents, Congress did not
immediately do so, and initially patent ownership was treated as a matter of
common law.16  Before the patent statutes were enacted, the Supreme Court
weighed in on the issue of transfer of patent rights in Ager v. Murray.17  In that
case, the Court famously held that intellectual property interests, because of
statutes.  See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).





13. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
15. See id.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. 105 U.S. 126 (1881).
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their intangible nature, could not be transferred by operation of law without a
written assignment.18  Murray had obtained a judgment against Ager for
defaulting on a promissory note, but with the exception of a single patent, Ager
had no property to satisfy the judgment.19  Murray asked the court to stop any
future transfers of the patent while the suit was pending and requested that the
patent be sold to satisfy the judgment.20  The Court used an analogous argument
from an earlier copyright case, holding that a patent’s abstract nature makes it
impossible to seize in the conventional sense.21  Because a patent cannot be
seized in the traditional sense, the Court held that “[t]he debtor’s interest in the
patent-rights is property, assignable by him, and which cannot be taken on
execution at law.”22  Thus, patent rights could not be transferred as a matter of
law, at least to settle a money judgment.  As an alternative, the Court suggested
using a court order to compel an assignment by the debtor.23  It is important to
note that Ager’s reasoning did not involve statutory interpretation; the Court
relied exclusively on common law principles because the Patent Act was not yet
on the books.24
Skipping forward into the twentieth century, the Federal Circuit began
relaxing the strict writing requirement suggested by Ager.  In H.M. Stickle v.
Heublein, Inc., the Federal Circuit considered a case where the inventor died,
leaving the patent rights with the rest of his estate in a will.25  The facts of
Stickle are complex but can be summarized as follows: Mr. Stickle invented and
patented a new type of taco-shell fryer and founded a company, La Hacienda,
to manufacture these machines.26  La Hacienda sold the machines to Heublein,
Inc., who used them to produce taco shells.27  Heublein later hired Stickle to
design a different type of fryer to replace the ones La Hacienda was currently
selling to Heublein.28  Stickle did so, but Heublein was not satisfied, and Stickle
grew ill and ultimately died before the matter was resolved.29  Stickle’s brother-
in-law took over control of La Hacienda when Stickle became ill, and the
18. See id. at 131.
19. Id. at 127.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 130 (citing Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528, 531 (1852)).
22. Id. at 131.
23. Id. at 130.
24. See id. at 127-131.
25. 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
26. Id. at 1553-54.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1554-56.
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lawsuit resulted from continuing disagreement over contract and licensing
issues.30
Throughout the trial, Heublein maintained that the suit should be dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to establish that they owned the patent and thus
lacked the rights to sue over it.31  The plaintiffs, including Stickle’s wife, argued
that Stickle’s will operated to transfer the patent under the Texas probate code.32
With almost no discussion, the Federal Circuit found that the patent rights
transferred by operation of law under the Texas probate code, which provides
for a testator’s entire estate to vest immediately in a will’s beneficiaries.33  Thus,
without even mentioning Ager or 35 U.S.C. § 261, the court effectively created
an exception to the writing requirement when the patent is part of an estate
transferred by will at the patentee’s death.34  Though it was only a minor point
in the ultimate resolution of the case, this finding opened the door for
subsequent cases to relax the writing requirement in patent transfers.
By using the Texas probate code to decide the issue of patent ownership,
Stickle raised a significant question of federalism in patent ownership.  Though
the United States Constitution clearly gives Congress authority over issuing
patents,35 the Federal Circuit has held that states retain authority over the
property aspect of patent ownership.36  On the other hand, when patent
ownership raises the constitutional issue of standing, the Federal Circuit has
treated it as a matter of federal law.37  In DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB
Advanced Media, L.P., the Federal Circuit held that the question of patent
ownership should be treated as a matter of federal law when it raises standing
issues, which implicate constitutional concerns.38  Assuming these cases were
correctly decided, they create a difficulty in resolving patent issues: federal law
30. Id. at 1556.
31. Id. at 1557.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1557-58.
34. See id.
35. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
36. See, e.g., Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that this principle applies to foreign property law by analogue); Int’l Nutrition
Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that this principle
requires enforcement of a contractual provision to use French law in a patent ownership
dispute); Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(holding that “who owns the patent rights . . . is a question exclusively for state courts”).
37. See DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1289-90 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (treating the validity of an automatic patent assignment clause as a question of
federal law because the claim involved the issue of standing).
38. See id.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
62 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  64:57
governs patent issuance and contents, but state law governs patent ownership. 
As a result, any court deciding a patent issue will first have to categorize the
nature of the dispute and decide whether to apply state or federal law. 
After the Stickle opinion, the Federal Circuit struggled with its implications. 
Some opinions chose not to expand Stickle’s exception to other contexts.  For
example, in Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc.,39 the Federal Circuit
considered a contractual assignment clause, in which the parties agreed that the
inventions “will be assigned” if certain conditions were met.40  The court held
that the assignment clause did not serve to automatically transfer legal title upon
satisfaction of the conditions.41  The opinion did not mention Stickle, nor did it
refer to the writing requirements found in Ager and 35 U.S.C. § 261;
nevertheless, the decision is consistent with the writing requirement and a very
narrow reading of Stickle.42  The Federal Circuit could have allowed state
contract law to allow a transfer by operation of law in the same manner that
Stickle allowed a transfer via state probate law.  Faced with an opportunity to
relax the writing requirement, however, the court declined to do so by holding
the contractual assignment clause ineffective.43  
The Federal Circuit followed a similar path in Gaia Technologies, Inc. v.
Reconversion Technologies, Inc.44  Relying on Arachnid’s reasoning, the court
held that an oral agreement to assign a patent at a later time did not itself serve
as an assignment or confer standing to sue for patent infringement.45 
Furthermore, the court held that the minutes of the meeting, though they
documented the agreement, could not serve as a written assignment because
they “[were] a memorialization of an [oral] agreement” rather than a written
agreement conveying title.46
The Federal Circuit did not continue this trend forever.  In 2008, the court
handed down Akazawa v. Link New Technology International, Inc.47  In
Akazawa, the court extended the Stickle holding even further by allowing a
patent transfer without a writing in the context of intestate succession.48 
Yasumasa Akazawa was the inventor listed on a patent, and he died intestate
with his wife and daughters as his only heirs.49  His daughters assigned their
39. 939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
40. See id. at 1580-81.
41. See id. at 1581.
42. See id. at 1577-82.
43. See id. at 1580-81. 
44. 93 F.3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
45. See id. at 779.
46. Id.
47. 520 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
48. See id. at 1356-57.
49. Id. at 1355.
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interests in the patent to their mother, Hitomi, who then executed a written
assignment of all of her rights in the patent to Akira Akazawa, plaintiff in the
infringement action.50  Link, the defendant, filed for summary judgment on the
ground that Akira lacked standing to sue for infringement because Yasumasa’s
estate made no written assignment to his heirs.51  At trial, the district court
focused almost entirely on the terms of 35 U.S.C. § 261, which states that a
patent “shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”52  The trial court
reasoned that without a written assignment from the estate, Yasumasa’s heirs
had received no rights in the patent, and therefore the subsequent conveyances
were ineffective to transfer rights.53
On appeal, the Federal Circuit took a very different approach.  Instead of
relying entirely on § 261, the court held that “there is nothing that limits
assignment as the only means for transferring patent ownership,” and that
patent rights may instead be transferred “by operation of law.”54  In support of
this holding, the court cited 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), which states that “[e]very
patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns.”55  In the
plain language of § 154(a)(1), “assigns” and “heirs” are distinct categories, and
the court held that § 261 of the Patent Act — which imposes a writing
requirement for patent assignments — applies only to transfers within the
“assigns” category and not to the patentee’s heirs.56
The court also relied heavily on the Stickle decision; though the court
recognized that it was not directly controlling because it involved testamentary
rather than intestate succession, the Stickle opinion nevertheless allowed a
patent transfer by operation of state probate law instead of federal patent law.57 
To support this position, the court looked to Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech
Systems,58 which held that patent ownership is a state court question.59  In doing
so, the court read that holding expansively; though Jim Arnold Corp.’s holding
concerned only whether the state court had jurisdiction, here the court read it
to mean that state law controls in patent ownership cases.60
Having established that state law generally controls patent ownership,
Akazawa held that the same doctrine should apply when foreign law, rather than
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1355-56 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006)).
53. See id.
54. Id. at 1356.
55. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1356-57.
58. 109 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
59. Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1357 (citing Jim Arnold Corp., 109 F.3d at 1572). 
60. See id.
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state law, controls.61  To reach that conclusion, the court drew support from its
earlier decision in International Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd.,62
which granted comity to a French court’s determination of title ownership in a
patent dispute between two foreign corporations.63  In Akazawa, once the court
held that Japanese intestacy law should control the ownership of the patents, it
followed that Yasumasa’s wife and daughters could have received title to patent
upon his death by operation of that law.64  Instead of deciding this question on
appeal, however, the court remanded the issue for determination by the district
court.65
III.  Statement of the Case
In the wake of Akazawa, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit took an opportunity to test the outer limits of its holding.  In Sky
Technologies L.L.C. v. SAP AG, the court considered whether patents may be
transferred by operation of law through foreclosure in the same way that
Akazawa had done with intestate succession.66 
A. Facts
Sky Technologies presented a complicated factual scenario.  In 1996, Jeffrey
Conklin obtained the patents at issue via his company, TradeAccess, which later
changed its name to Ozro, Incorporated.67  Conklin assigned all of his personal
rights in the patents to the company, as did the other investors.68  These
assignments were properly executed and recorded with the PTO.69  In 2001,
Ozro took out loans from Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Cross Atlantic
Capital Partners, Incorporated. (XACP) and executed security agreements with
each company, using these patents as collateral.70  The security agreements
explicitly gave both lenders the right of remedies under the Massachusetts UCC
in the event of default, including the right to take possession of the collateral
and sell it.71  Later, SVB transferred its security interest to XACP by assignment
61. See id. at 1357-58.
62. See id. at 1357-58 (citing Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
63. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 257 F.3d at 1330.
64. See Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1358.
65. Id.




70. Id. at 1376-77.
71. Id. at 1377.
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and recorded it with the Patent and Trademark Office; as a result, XACP owned
the full security interest for the patents.72
In 2003, Ozro defaulted on the loan, and XACP foreclosed on the patents.73 
XACP issued a foreclosure notice to Ozro’s creditors announcing that the
patents would be sold at a public auction, in accordance with UCC provisions.74 
Before the auction, however, Conklin’s new company, Sky Technologies LLC
(Sky Technologies), negotiated with XACP to obtain the patent rights.75  They
came to an agreement that XACP would do its best to get the patents, bidding
up to $4,031,844 for them at the auction, and transfer them to Sky
Technologies.76
XACP foreclosed on the patents on July 14, 2003, and purchased all of the
patents at the public auction.77  During these foreclosure proceedings, however,
Ozro never made a written assignment of the patents to XACP, nor did XACP
demand one.78  After the auction, XACP assigned all of its rights in the patents
to Sky Technologies in accordance with the agreement.79  According to Sky
Technologies, SAP AG (a German corporation doing business in the U.S. via
a subsidiary company incorporated in Delaware) was selling software that
infringed on several of the patents.80  Believing itself to be the owner of the
patents, Sky Technologies sued SAP for patent infringement in 2006.81
B. Procedural History
After Sky Technologies filed suit in 2006, SAP moved to dismiss the claim,
arguing that Sky Technologies lacked ownership of the patents, and, as a result,
did not have standing to bring the suit.82  The district court held that title to the
patents transferred by operation of law to XACP under the foreclosure
provisions in the Massachusetts UCC, even though there was never a written
assignment executed by Ozro.83  The district court reasoned that under






77. Id. at 1378.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 2-3, 14-28, Sky Techs. LLC v. SAP
AG, No. 2:06-cv-440 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), 2007 WL 1089966.
81. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1378.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Massachusetts UCC as allowing transfer of a patent by foreclosure.84  As a
result, the district court held that Sky Technologies had standing to bring the
infringement suit.85  SAP filed a motion to certify the question of Sky
Technologies’s standing for an interlocutory appeal, which the district court
granted, finding “substantial grounds for difference of opinion.”86
On appeal, the question was “whether XACP had legal right, title, and
interest in the patents-in-suit to transfer all of those rights to Sky, thereby
providing Sky with standing to bring the underlying infringement claim.”87  The
Federal Circuit held that the rights and title did transfer by operation of law
from Ozro to XACP with the foreclosure.88  Thus, XACP was able to transfer
rights and title to Sky Technologies, giving it standing to bring the infringement
suit.89
C. Rationale
In its decision, the court focused primarily on applying precedent to the facts
of the case.  In interpreting Akazawa, the court noted that state law generally
controls questions of patent ownership.90  The court also recognized that where
the constitutional issue of standing is involved, federal law may be implicated.91 
In describing the division of power, the court noted that “federal law is used to
determine the validity and terms of an assignment, but state law controls any
transfer of patent ownership by operation of law not deemed an assignment.”92 
Under federal law, patent assignments must be in writing, as stated in 35 U.S.C.
§ 261, though the requirement actually harkens all the way back to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ager.93  Instead of finding this writing requirement
controlling in the case, however, the court read Akazawa’s holding broadly.94
The court interpreted Akazawa to allow for patent transfers by operation of
law without a written assignment.95  Under this interpretation, assignments are
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87. Id. at 1379.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 1380-81.
90. See id. at 1379.
91. Id. (citing DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
92. Id.
93. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006)).
94. See id. at 1379-80.




not the only means by which to transfer title.96  In Akazawa, transfer was done
by intestate succession; here, the court extended the concept to foreclosure.97 
For support, the court focused on Akazawa’s strong choice of words: “[T]here
is nothing that limits assignment as the only means of transferring patent
ownership.”98  If the transfer is by operation of law, and not by assignment, then
the rule requiring a written assignment should not apply.99  Because non-
assignment patent transfers can avoid the writing requirement under Akazawa,
and because the foreclosure proceeding was not a patent assignment,100 the lack
of a written transfer from Ozro to XACP was immaterial to the decision.
After relying on precedent to determine that state law can allow patent
transfer by operation of law, the court turned to the state statutes governing the
foreclosure.101  The security agreement between Ozro and XACP gave XACP
“the right to exercise all the remedies of a secured party upon such default
under the Massachusetts UCC,”102 so the Massachusetts UCC provisions
controlled the resulting ownership dispute.103  UCC section 9-610 allows a party
to sell the collateral when the debtor defaults, and section 9-617 states that the
buyer gets all of the debtor’s rights in the collateral upon purchase.104  By
following the appropriate foreclosure procedures, including giving notice to
Ozro’s creditors, XACP acquired all of Ozro’s rights in the patents-in-suit when
it bought them at auction.105  SAP argued that UCC section 9-619 concerning
transfer statements imposed a writing requirement of its own, so that even if the
court did not find 35 U.S.C. § 261 controlling, the transfer still failed.106  The
court rejected this argument, however, stating that the purpose of transfer
statements in the UCC is to make title clear when transferred to a third party
and to provide assurance for third party buyers; in other words, it does not
require a writing, but merely states that such a writing will be recognized.107 
Thus, the court concluded because XACP followed the UCC procedures, it had
acquired good title to the patents and was able to transfer them to Sky
Technologies.108
96. See id. (citing Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356).
97. See id.
98. Id. (quoting Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356).
99. See id. 
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1380-81.
102. Id. at 1377 (quoting the security agreement between Ozro and XACP).
103. See id. at 1380.
104. See id. at 1380-81.
105. Id. at 1380-81.
106. See id. at 1381.
107. See id.
108. See id.
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To reach its holding that foreclosure can transfer patent ownership by
operation of law, the court had to contend with 35 U.S.C. § 154.  Section
154(a)(1) contemplates three classes of patent owners: patentees, patentees’
heirs, and patentees’ assigns.109  That section, SAP argued, limited Akazawa’s
holding because Akazawa dealt only with a transfer to a patentee’s heirs.110 
Because a transfer by foreclosure is not a transfer to the patentee herself nor to
the patentee’s heirs, it must be a transfer to the patentee’s assigns, and therefore
requiring a written assignment.111  This argument did not persuade the court,
which stated that § 154 “fails to specifically address transfers of patent
ownership.”112  Instead, the court held this section merely describes a patent’s
contents and does not impose limitations on patent ownership or transfer.113
The last argument addressed by the court was SAP’s claim that the
Massachusetts UCC, if it permits a patent transfer without a writing, conflicts
with § 261 and is therefore preempted by federal law.114  The court rejected this
argument with almost no discussion.115  The court had already held that § 261
applies only to assignments and that foreclosure under the UCC is a non-
assignment transfer by operation of law, so it found no conflict between the
state and federal laws.116  The court held that because the state law did not
conflict with federal law, there was no preemption issue, and this argument
lacked merit.117
After the court addressed the legal arguments it considered the policy
implications of its decision.  First, the court reasoned that to hold otherwise —
that foreclosure did not transfer patent title without a written assignment —
would invalidate a number of patent transfers that would otherwise be valid.118 
Second, the court made an economic argument, stating that a contrary holding
would reduce the value of patents.119  Requiring a written assignment in
foreclosure, in the court’s view, would effectively limit the patent’s usefulness
as collateral and consequently make patents less valuable as assets.120  Last, the
court stated that requiring secured parties to obtain written assignments from
109. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).













defaulted debtors would not be practical.121  This argument had similar
consequences as the court’s economic argument; if lenders know that they will
have to get a written assignment from the debtor in addition to a foreclosure in
the event of a default, the lender will be less willing to accept patents as
collateral.122  These policy considerations provided practical support for the
court’s legal reasoning described above.
In the end, the court’s decision can be described generally with three main
assertions: (1) state law controls patent ownership;123 (2) Akazawa’s reasoning
allows for transfers by operation of law that do not invoke the writing
requirement for patent assignments;124 and (3) public policy concerns would be
hindered by a contrary holding.125
IV. Analysis
Sky Technologies was decided incorrectly because the court relied on
generalizations about the law that are not supported by a thorough study of
precedent, and it failed to recognize important distinctions drawn by earlier
cases.  This part begins with a discussion of the court’s misuse of precedent in
deciding that state law exclusively controls issues of patent ownership.  Next,
this part contends that the court misinterpreted the holding in Akazawa by
extending it to cover the foreclosure scenario.  Finally, this section discusses the
public policy implications of the court’s decision.
A. The Court Improperly Held that State Law Exclusively Controls Issues of
Patent Ownership by Making Unsupported Generalizations and Ignoring
Important Distinctions Made in Earlier Decisions
Though the court’s generalization that state law, rather than federal, controls
patent ownership was stated as though it is well-settled law, the matter is in fact
more complex and merits more discussion than it was given in the opinion.  In
Akazawa, the Federal Circuit stated this rule directly but used it only
indirectly.126  Because the Akazawa case involved transfer by Japanese intestacy
law, the court stated generally that state law controlled patent transfers, then
held that by analogy foreign law controls a patent transfer between foreign
citizens.127  Thus, even though Akazawa stated the principle that “state law . . .
121. See id. 
122. See id. at 1381-82.
123. See id. at 1379.
124. See id. at 1379-80.
125. See id. at 1381-82.
126. Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
127. See id.
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governs patent ownership,” the actual rule used in the decision was narrower —
foreign law controls ownership when the patentee is a foreign citizen.128
The Akazawa court used two earlier Federal Circuit cases to support the
proposition that state law governs issues of patent ownership:129 Jim Arnold
Corp. v. Hydrotech System, Inc.130 and International Nutrition Co. v. Horphag
Research Ltd.131  In Jim Arnold Corp., the holding was based on subject matter
jurisdiction, not on regulatory authority or choice of law.132  The court held that
there was no federal jurisdiction over the patent ownership claim because the
ownership dispute arose under state contract law, not under the Patent Act.133 
Because the Federal Circuit’s decision was limited to jurisdiction, and because
the chief issue concerned contract interpretation rather than patent validity, it
does not lend as much support to the claim “that state law, not federal law,
typically governs patent ownership” as the Akazawa court seemed to suggest.134 
Akazawa also relied on International Nutrition Co. for support.135  In that
case, the Federal Circuit extended Jim Arnold Corp.’s reasoning and held by
analogy that granting comity to a French court’s decision regarding patent
ownership was appropriate because the ownership dispute did not arise out of
the Patent Act.136  At first glance, this case might seem to better support the Sky
Technologies decision than Jim Arnold Corp. because the issue was about
which law to apply, rather than whether the court could exercise jurisdiction.137 
On the other hand, the holding in International Nutrition Co. only determined
whether to grant comity to a foreign decision and did not decide whether state
or federal law controlled patent ownership.138
In H.M. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.,139 which was discussed in Akazawa140 but
not directly cited or discussed in Sky Technologies,141 the court considered this
matter settled — possibly because the parties did not argue it — and did not
address the issue in deciding that the Texas probate code allowed the transfer
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1357-58. 
130. 109 F.3d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
131. 257 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
132. See Jim Arnold Corp., 109 F.3d at 1572.
133. See id.
134. See Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1357.
135. See id. at 1357-58.
136. See Int’l Nutrition Co., 257 F.3d at 1329.
137. See id. at 1329-30.
138. See id.
139. 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
140. See Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356-57.
141. See Sky Techs., L.L.C. v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1378-82 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss1/3
2011] NOTES 71
of patent by will upon the patentee’s death.142  Thus, Stickle seems to support
Sky Technologies’s proposition that state law controls, but the support it
provides is tenuous because the opinion does not explain the court’s reasoning. 
More recently, the Federal Circuit addressed a similar issue in DDB
Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P.143  In that case, the Federal
Circuit considered “whether the question of automatic assignment is governed
by federal or state law.”144  The court held that the automatic assignment clauses
were related to the constitutional issue of standing and treated the question as
one of federal law.145  This case would seem to suggest that Sky Technologies
should have treated this issue as one of federal law, because both involved the
constitutional issue of standing.  Nonetheless, the court in Sky Technologies
distinguished its situation from that in DDB.146  Because DDB involved an
assignment, it fell under the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 261; Sky Technologies did
not, the court reasoned, involve an assignment, so DDB was not applicable.147 
Judge Newman’s dissent in DDB seems to anticipate the position later taken in
Akazawa and Sky Technologies: he argued that the majority overreached in
finding federal preemption, and held fast to the line of cases finding state law
controlling.148
Overall, the question of state law’s role in determining patent ownership is
complex.  The court in Sky Technologies relied most directly on Akazawa,
which is understandable because that case was recent and contained directly
supportive language.149  On the other hand, Akazawa’s language about state law
was mere dicta.150  The issue in Akazawa was whether foreign intestacy law
should be recognized as transferring title of a U.S. patent; consequently, the
language about state law controlling patent ownership was not essential to the
holding.151  Therefore, it would have been appropriate for the court in Sky
Technologies to devote more discussion to the matter.  Though Akazawa stated
that the “case law is clear” on the question,152 a study of the prior cases
demonstrates the matter was not so clearly settled.
A brief review of prior cases shows that the question of whether state law
exclusively controls patent ownership was not clearly settled before Sky
142. See H.M. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1557-58.
143. 517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
144. Id. at 1289-90.
145. Id. at 1290.
146. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1379.
147. See id.
148. See DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1296 (Newman, J., dissenting).
149. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1378-80. 
150. See Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
151. See id. at 1355, 1357.
152. See id. at 1357.
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Technologies.  Stickle, which the Sky Technologies court did not cite directly
but relied on indirectly through Akazawa, is somewhat weak support for the
proposition, because its holding that the state probate code controlled patent
transfers with a will contained almost no discussion on the matter and did not
directly address choice of law.153  Later, in Jim Arnold Corp. — cited in Sky
Technologies via Akazawa — the Federal Circuit held only that state court
jurisdiction is appropriate in cases regarding patent ownership.154  International
Nutrition provides more support for the idea that state law controls patent
ownership, but like Akazawa, used the state-law-controls principle only by
analogy to reach a decision granting comity to a foreign court.155  DDB
Technologies’ holding also suggests treating the matter as one of federal law
where standing is implicated, as it was in Sky Technologies.156  The court in Sky
Technologies distinguished DDB Technologies by relying on its own holding
that foreclosure transfers a patent by operation of law instead of by
assignment.157  On the other hand, if that holding were erroneous, then DDB
Technologies would be directly on point, and the court should have declined the
question as one of federal law because it raises issues of standing.158
These cases indicate that the matter is far from clear in case law, and the
court in Sky Technologies would have been wise to give the matter thorough
analysis and discussion in the opinion instead of relying on Akazawa’s bold
statement of the principle.  It is worth noting that one well-known commentator
would have agreed with the decision, at least in a pre-DDB Technologies
setting.159  In an article, Thomas L. Bahrick explained that transfer of patents by
foreclosure is governed by state law because federal law does not directly
address patent foreclosure.160  In the article, Bahrick explicitly noted that some
states “allow traditional foreclosure proceedings concerning intangible
property.”161  In Sky Technologies, however, the court erred when it used such
a simplistic analysis in the wake of DDB Technologies.  The court should have
followed the lead of DDB Technologies and treated the question as one of
federal law because the case involved an issue of standing.
153. See H.M. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
154. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1379 (citing Akazawa 520 F.3d at 1357 (citing Jim Arnold
Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997))). 
155. See Int’l Nutrition Co. v. Horphag Research Ltd., 257 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
156. See DDB Technologies, L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1289-
90 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
157. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1379.
158. See DDB Techs., 517 F.3d at 1289-90.






B. The Court Misinterpreted Akazawa’s Holding Allowing Patent Transfer
by Operation of Law
As the primary foundation for its decision, the court in Sky Technologies
cited Akazawa’s holding that state law can provide for a non-assignment patent
transfer by operation of law.162  As the court interpreted Akazawa, a transfer by
operation of law removes the writing requirement by sidestepping the rules
applicable to patent assignments.163  In interpreting the holding this way, the
Federal Circuit misread Akazawa, which stated this principle in the context of
a discussion of the applicability of 35 U.S.C. § 261’s writing requirement for
patent assignments to transfer to a patentee’s heirs by intestate succession.164 
Akazawa allowed an exception to the writing requirement for patent transfers,
but based its argument for the exception within the language of the Patent Act
itself.165  On the other hand, the court in Sky Technologies created an exception
to the long-held writing requirement without textual support from the Patent
Act.166
The writing requirement for patent transfers has a long history, and it is
necessary to trace its path to judge the holding in Sky Technologies.  The
Supreme Court created the writing requirement in Ager v. Murray, the
granddaddy of all patent transfer cases.167  Because the Patent Act had not yet
been passed, Ager did not interpret a federal statute; instead, it relied strictly on
common law principles, which distinguishes it from later cases.168  In Ager, the
Court reasoned that because intellectual property could not be seized by a
creditor in the same way as tangible property, a patent assignment must be in
writing.169  In the Court’s view, the primary concern is certainty — because a
patent cannot be held in the hand or seized at will, a writing provides definitive
proof of ownership.170  The Court’s language is very telling:  “The debtor’s
interest in the patent-rights is property, assignable by him, and which cannot be
taken on execution at law.”171  This language seems to indicate that the Court
intended to expressly disallow the precise sort of unwritten transfer authorized
by Akazawa and Sky Technologies. 
162. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1380.
163. See id. at 1380-81.
164. See Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
165. See id.
166. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1380-81.
167. 105 U.S. 126 (1881).
168. See id. at 128-129.  The modern patent scheme was created by the Patent Act of 1952,
which imposes a writing requirement.  Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
169. See Ager, 105 U.S. at 129-31. 
170. See id. at 130-31.
171. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
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The Federal Circuit in Sky Technologies distinguished Ager and did not find
it applicable to the case.172  First, the court read Ager as applying only to patent
transfers between a purchaser and a seller.173  Second, the court distinguished
Ager by reading it as limited to patent assignments, and not applicable to
transfers by operation of law; in the Court’s words, Ager “required [the
patentee] to execute a writing to assign title.”174  These attempts to distinguish
Ager were mistaken, however.  Ager’s concern regarding the incorporeal nature
of intellectual property and its plain language regarding transfer by operation
of law sharply contrast with the proposed limitation to the buyer-seller
relationship.175  Furthermore, Ager clearly prohibits transfer by execution of law
without a written assignment; by its plain language, Ager includes transfer by
operation of law in its holding.176  Admittedly, Ager is over a century old, and
it predates the Patent Act.177  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not revisited
Ager’s holding, either to overrule it or distinguish it, and the Patent Act did not
countermand it.  As a result, Ager is still good law and should still be treated as
binding by lower courts.
Furthermore, the fact that 35 U.S.C. § 261, requiring a writing for a patent
assignment, was enacted after Ager should not limit Ager’s direct applicability
to Sky Technologies.178  The court mentioned Ager only as the origin of 35
U.S.C. § 261’s writing requirement.179  Because 35 U.S.C. § 261 was enacted
after Ager was decided, it should be considered the current authority on patent
transfers.  By the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, 35 U.S.C. § 261 applies only to
patent assignments.180  However, the language of Ager suggested a more
expansive holding; it not only required a writing for assignments, it also
prohibited transfers by “execution at law.”181  Assuming arguendo, that the
court correctly reasoned that transfers by foreclosure are outside the scope of
35 U.S.C. § 261, Ager still flatly prohibits an unwritten patent transfer by
execution of law.  Thus, a patent foreclosure is either covered by 35 U.S.C. §
261, in which case it is invalid without a written assignment, or else it is a
transfer under execution of law, in which case it is prohibited by Ager without
a written assignment.  By either interpretaion, a written assignment is required. 
172. See Sky Techs., L.L.C. v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1379 (emphasis added).
175. See Ager, 105 U.S. at 131.
176. See id.
177. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006); Ager, 105 U.S. 126.
178. See Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006); Ager, 105 U.S. 126.
179. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1379.
180. See id. at 1380.
181. See Ager, 105 U.S. at 131.
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Ager is older and more out-of-mind than more recent cases such as Akazawa,
but because it is a Supreme Court decision, it should have been afforded more
weight in the court’s reasoning.
Even within the scope of more recent Federal Circuit decisions the Sky
Technologies holding is on unsure footing.  The court indirectly relied on the
Stickle case, which was not mentioned in the opinion but featured prominently
in Akazawa.182  In Stickle, the court applied the Texas probate code to transfer
a patent using a patentee’s will.183  The patent ownership question, however,
was not a main focus of the case — it was merely a threshold through which the
court passed to reach its ultimate decision.184  Furthermore, the opinion did not
mention transfer by operation of law, nor the assignment requirements of 35
U.S.C. § 261, nor Ager, nor any other major patent cases.185  The fact that the
court permitted the transfer by probate law is significant, but without any
discussion of why, it is impossible to draw a meaningful rule from the case —
it is possible that counsel simply failed to bring Ager and 35 U.S.C. § 261 to the
court’s attention.
Although the Sky Technologies court did not mention Stickle, that case
influenced the court’s opinion indirectly through subsequent cases.  Stickle’s
primary influence on Sky Technologies was through Akazawa, which cited
Stickle as an earlier example of using probate law to transfer patent rights
without a written assignment.186  Despite citing it for support, the Akazawa
court recognized that Stickle did not fully resolve the issue because it involved
a will rather than intestate succession.187  Thus, Akazawa had to consider other
possible justifications to support its holding that state (or foreign) law can
permit a patent transfer by intestate succession without falling under 35 U.S.C.
§ 261’s writing requirement.188
The Akazawa court recognized that 35 U.S.C. § 261 imposes a writing
requirement for patent assignments.189  To reach its holding that title was
nevertheless transferred, the court relied on 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) to conclude
that 35 U.S.C. § 261 did not apply.190  The court concluded that because the
Patent Act contemplated “heirs” as a distinct class from “assigns,” the writing
182. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1378-82; Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d
1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
183. See H.M. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
184. See id. at 1557-58.
185. See id.
186. See Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
187. Id. at 1357.
188. See id. at 1355-58.
189. Id. at 1355-56.
190. See id. at 1356.
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requirement for assignments did not apply to transfers under intestate
succession.191  Thus, the Federal Circuit held that the lower court erred when it
focused exclusively on 35 U.S.C. § 261 because 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) created
an exception that applied to the case.192 
During the discussion regarding the interplay between 35 U.S.C. § 261’s
writing requirement for assignments and 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)’s classes of
patent ownership, the Akazawa court stated that nothing limits assignment as
the only permissible means of transfer.193  Sky Technologies referred to this
language but isolated the quote from its context.194 United States Code Title 35
Section 154(a)(1) provides for three distinct classes of patent owners: the
patentee, the patentee’s heirs, and assigns.195  Both Stickle and Akazawa dealt
with transfers to this second category, and so it was entirely reasonable for
those cases to find transfers to heirs outside of the typical assignment rules.  Sky
Technologies, on the other hand, did not involve either a patentee or a
patentee’s heirs, which left only the third class of patent owners: assigns, to
which 35 U.S.C. § 261’s requirements directly apply.
While the Sky Technologies opinion did address this matter, it did so in a
very terse way by simply stating that “[s]ection 154 does not restrict patent
ownership to these three classes,” and that it does not “specifically address
transfers of patent ownership.”196  Admittedly, 35 U.S.C. § 154 does not address
patent transfers, but it is part of a larger title of patent law and should be
interpreted in accordance with the other sections in the title.197  Akazawa read
the statutes together and stated a theory that was consistent with both.198  In Sky
Technologies, however, the court reached a different conclusion, holding that
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) did not limit patent ownership to the three classes.199 
Thus, Sky Technologies extended Akazawa’s holding to cover a new class of
transfers while simultaneously rejecting Akazawa’s rationale.200
The discussion in Akazawa about transfers by operation of law, which
provides the foundation for the holding in Sky Technologies, is located in the
same paragraph as its reliance on 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), and does not make




194. Sky Techs., L.L.C. v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
195. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
196. Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1381.
197. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 151-318 (2006).  
198. See Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356.
199. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1381.
200. See id.
201. See Akazawa, 520 F.3d at 1356.
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transfer by operation of law outside the context, Sky Technologies overextended
its holding and stands on dubious footing.
Outside of the context of transfers to heirs, the Federal Circuit has otherwise
disallowed transfers without a writing.  In Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries,
Inc.,202 the court held that an automatic assignment clause in a contract could
not transfer patent rights by operation of law.203  As a result, without a written
assignment the clause did not provide the would-be assignee with legal title,
and therefore did not provide standing in a patent infringement suit.204 
Similarly, in Gaia Technologies, Inc. v. Reconversion Technologies, Inc.,205 the
court held that an oral agreement to assign a patent during a board meeting was
insufficient to transfer title, even with written documentation of the agreement
in the form of the meeting’s minutes.206  These cases are easily distinguishable
from the decisions in Stickle and Akazawa in that they both involve patent
transfers between commercial interests, whereas Stickle and Akazawa both
involve transfers to heirs.  This distinction supports the view, rejected by the
court in Sky Technologies, that the two decisions allowing non-assignment
transfers by operation of law were limited in their scope by 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1).
In Sky Technologies the Federal Circuit extended Akazawa’s holding past its
scope.  Both Arachnid and Gaia illustrate a trend of enforcing the writing
requirement imposed by Ager and 35 U.S.C. § 261 in cases not involving the
patentee’s heirs.  By extending Akazawa’s holding while simultaneously
rejecting its reasoning, Sky Technologies created an improper exception to the
traditional writing requirement for patent transfers.
C. Policy Implications
In addition to the legal arguments discussed supra, the policy implications
of Sky Technologies merit attention.  In the opinion, the court addressed three
concerns: (1) invalidation of otherwise valid holdings; (2) reduction in the value
of patents; and (3) impracticability of forcing secured parties to obtain written
assignments from defaulting debtors.207  The first concern — that patents
obtained by foreclosure would be invalidated — would have been unavoidable
if the court had held otherwise.  Though it would be impossible to completely
avoid this consequence, the effect could have been hedged or minimized
through a carefully worded holding; for example, the court could have allowed
202. 939 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
203. See id. at 1580-81.
204. Id. at 1581.
205. 93 F.3d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
206. Id. at 779.
207. Sky Techs., L.L.C. v. SAP AG, 576 F.3d 1374, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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for secured parties who foreclosed patents in the time before the matter was
settled to seek a judicial determination that they are the rightful owners of the
patent.  Additionally, the Supreme Court in Ager offered a century-old solution:
if the debtor is not around or refuses to execute a written assignment to the
secured party, the secured party could ask the court to appoint a trustee to
execute it in the debtor’s place.208  By choosing its language carefully and
providing alternatives, the court could have minimized the number of otherwise
valid patents obtained by foreclosure from being invalidated.
The second policy concern raised by the court was that patent values might
be diminished if the court required a written assignment to transfer patent rights
in the event of a default.209  The underlying theory here seems to be that by not
creating a new means of transferring an already transferrable patent, it becomes
less valuable as an asset.  A contrary holding, however, would not have limited
the ability to use a patent as collateral in a secured transaction.  The patent
could still be collateral, and if the debtor defaulted, the patent could still be
foreclosed.  The only difference would arise in those cases in which the secured
party failed to obtain a written assignment of the patent during foreclosure. 
Once again, Ager’s solution could apply:  if the debtor refused to assign the
patent, the court could appoint a trustee to do so in the debtor’s place.210  The
court’s third concern — that it would not be practical to force secured parties
to get written assignments from defaulting debtors — could be handled with the
same procedure.  Thus, by recognizing the court’s ability to force an assignment
or appoint a trustee to execute it, most of the policy concerns raised by Sky
Technologies disappear.
The decision also raises other concerns that are not discussed by the court. 
Judicial economy is such a concern, but could be argued both ways.  On one
hand, requiring a foreclosing party to force an assignment or request that a
trustee be appointed requires more work for the courts and possibly creates
unnecessary steps.  On the other hand, the uncertainty in title that results from
allowing unwritten and unrecorded patent transfers will likely result in more
patent ownership disputes.  Any time the title chain is not clear and not in
writing, ownership disputes are more likely to erupt.  And unlike physical or
real property, with intangible property like patents, it is sometimes difficult to
show possession and create a presumption of ownership.  While the judicial
economy concern could certainly be argued both ways, the concern would be
reduced by requiring a written assignment.  Requiring a written assignment in
a foreclosure would promote certainty and clarity of title, which would prevent
208. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126, 132 (1881).
209. Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1381.
210. See Ager, 105 U.S. at 132.
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avoidable ownership disputes.  Though the extra step of forcing a written patent
assignment might be redundant in some circumstances, the courts’ time is better
spent avoiding conflicts than resolving them.
Lastly, it is worth looking to the legal consequences likely to result from the
Sky Technologies holding.  What will its effect be on the writing requirement
for different types of patent transfers? What are its limits?  Can any state statute
authorizing transfer of patents by operation of law satisfy the reasoning?  The
Akazawa opinion limited its discussion to the context of “heirs” in 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1).211  Sky Technologies, on the other hand, makes no attempt to limit
itself, nor does the opinion make any effort to define what it means by a
“transfer by operation of law.”212  The cases to date have all involved traditional
methods for transferring property when one party is unwilling or unable, e.g.,
foreclosure and probate.  Nothing in the Sky Technologies opinion limits its
holding to these methods alone.  To prevent legal confusion and uncertainty, the
court should have suggested some limits to its application.
V. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit’s holding in Sky Technologies overextended Akazawa’s
reasoning by removing it from its context.  In Akazawa, the court permitted a
transfer by operation of law to the patentee’s heirs without requiring a written
assignment.213  Akazawa’s holding, however, was issued in the context of a
discussion of 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), which creates three potential classes of
patent owners: patentees, patentees’ heirs, and assigns; since heirs are explicitly
distinguished from assigns in the patent code, it is reasonable to conclude the
rules concerning patent assignments might not apply to them.  In Sky
Technologies, however, the court extended the reasoning regarding patent
transfers by operation of law out of the context of patentees’ heirs and placed
it into the context of foreclosure.  In doing so, the underlying context and logic
that made sense in Akazawa disappeared.  As a result, the Federal Circuit’s
holding in Sky Technologies stretched Akazawa’s holding too far.
Christopher M. Crouch
211. See Akazawa v. Link New Tech. Int’l, Inc., 520 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
212. See Sky Techs., 576 F.3d at 1379-81.
213. See Akazawa 520 F.3d at 1357-58.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
